Handbook of Information Security Management
(Publisher: CRC Press LLC)
Author(s): Hal Tipton and Micki Krause, Consulting Editors
ISBN: 0849399475
Publication Date: 01/01/98

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New Alliance Partnership Model (NAPM)

In their presentation to the 18th National Information Systems Security Conference (October, 1995) on “The New Alliance: Gaining on Security Integrity Assurance”, Sanchez and Evans described a new alliance partnership model developed from a four-year case study in which security, configuration management, and quality assurance functions were combined with an overall automated information systems (AIS) security engineering process. In this paper, Sanchez and Evans delineated the following.

It has become critically essential for enterprise management to understand the interdependencies and complementary pursuits that exist between the Information Systems Design and Development, the Quality Assurance (QA), Configuration Management (CM), and the Information Systems Security (IS) organizational support functions. With this knowledge, it is equally important to identify and examine a synergistic approach for realizing additional economies (cost savings/avoidances) throughout the system development life cycle with continuous improvement techniques.

Implementation of product assurance and secure information technology development is a management decision that must be judiciously exercised and integrated as part of a system control architecture. In this model, automated information systems security management is recognized as the functional point of control and authority for coordinating and guiding the development, implementation, maintenance, and proceduralization of information security into a unique, integrated management team. The use of a security control architecture is the approved strategic methodology used to produce a composite system of security controls, requirements, and safeguards planned or implemented within an IS environment to ensure the integrity, availability, and confidentiality. This is the only approach that will allow for integration and cooperative input from the CM, AIS security engineering, and QA management groups. Each of these product assurance functional support groups must understand and embrace common corporate product assurance objectives, synergize resources, and emerge as a partnership free of corporate political strife dedicated to providing a harmonization of systems integrity, availability, and confidentiality.

The harmonization effort evolves as an enterprise-wide New Alliance Partnership Model (NAPM) in which:

  • QA provides an enhanced product assurance visibility by ensuring that the intended features and requirements, including but not limited to security, are present in the delivered software. QA allows program management and the customer to follow the evolution of a capability from request through requirement and design, to a fielded product. This provides management with an enhanced capability as well as a forum for identifying and minimizing misinterpretations and omissions which may lead to vulnerabilities in a delivered system. The formal specifications required by QA increase the chance that the desired capabilities will be developed. The formal documentation of corrective actions from reviews (of specifications, designs, etc.) lessens the chance that critical issues may go undetected.
  • CM provides management with the assurance that changes to an existing AIS are performed in an identifiable and controlled environment and that these changes do not adversely affect the integrity or availability properties of secure products, systems, and services. CM provides additional security assurance levels in that all additions, deletions, or changes made to a system do not compromise its integrity, availability, or confidentiality. CM is achieved through proceduralization and unbiased verification ensuring that changes to an AIS and/or all supporting documentation are updated properly, concentrating on four components: identification, change control, status accounting, and auditing.
  • IS provides additional controls and protection mechanisms based upon system specifications, confidentiality objectives, legislative requirements and mandates, or perceived levels of protection. AIS security primarily addresses the concerns associated with unauthorized access to, disclosure, modification, or destruction of sensitive or proprietary information, and denial of IT service. AIS security may be built into, or added onto, existing IT or developed IT products, systems, and services.
  • Organizational management provides the empowerment and guidance for the economies of scale.

Exhibit 8. System Definition and Design Constraints

Exhibit 9. Development, Testing, and Installation Constraints

A seminal case study was presented as proof of the concept for gaining security integrity assurance. It identified the interdependencies and synergy that exist between the CM, IS security engineering, and QA functional management activities. It describes how information technology, as a principle change driver, is forcing the need for a QA, CM, and AIS security forum to evolve if the enterprise is to be successful in providing high-integrity systems.

Sanchez and Evans were able to provide the following:

  1. Change is not easy. Change has not been easy. Change will not be easy. In this case study, the members of each respective management support team have championed the process improvement initiatives and the corrective actions taken thus far. It is important to emphasize that employee empowerment of this type must be supported by top management because security integrity engineering and the implementation of an integrated product assurance and secure information technology development process such as a control architecture is a proactive management decision.
  2. Information technology has been and will continue to be a major change driver that establishes a need for a functional organizational support forum dedicated to delivering high-integrity products and services. Each of the product assurance functional support organizations must understand and embrace common corporate product assurance objectives, synergize resources, and emerge as a partnership independent of corporate political strife and dedicated to harmonizing systems integrity, availability, and confidentiality.
  3. The New Alliance Partnership Model (NAPM) is a viable solution that has been put to the test and proven in a highly dynamic operational environment of ever-changing distributed processing technologies. The NAPM supports the integration process and requires that direct lines of communication be bridged between key functional support organizations so as to input and feedback closure information.

Exhibit 10. Operational Constraints

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