Handbook of Information Security Management
(Publisher: CRC Press LLC)
Author(s): Hal Tipton and Micki Krause, Consulting Editors
ISBN: 0849399475
Publication Date: 01/01/98

Previous | Table of Contents | Next

The overall audit solutions set should incorporate the use of browser access logs, enterprise security server audit logs, network and firewall system authentication server audit logs, application and middle-ware audit logs, URL filters and access information, mainframe system audit information, distributed systems operating system audit logs, data base management system audit logs, and other utilities that provide audit trail information such as accounting programs, network management products, etc.

The establishment of auditing capabilities over WWW environments follows closely with the integration of all external WWW servers with the firewall, as previously mentioned. This is important when looking at the various options available to address a comprehensive audit approach.

WWW servers can offer a degree of auditability based on the operating system of the server on which they reside. The more time-tested environments such as UNIX are perceived to be difficult to secure, whereas the emerging NT platform with its enhanced security features supposedly make it a more secure and trusted platform with a wide degree of audit tools and capabilities (though the vote is still out on NT, as some feel it hasn’t had the time and exposure to discover all the potential security holes, perceived or real). The point, though, is that in order to provide some auditing the first place to potentially implement the first audit is on the platform where the WWW server resides. Issues here are the use of privileged accounts and file logs and access logs for log-ins to the operating system, which could indicate a backdoor attack on the WWW server itself. If server-based log are utilized, they of course must be file protected and should be off-loaded to a nonserver-based machine to protect against after-the-fact corruption.

Though the server logs aren’t the only defensive logs that should be relied upon in a public WWW server environment, the other components in the access architecture should be considered for use as audit log tools. As previously mentioned, the WWW server should be placed in respect to its required controls in relation to the network security firewall. If it is a S-HTTP server that is placed behind (Exhibit 4) the firewall then the firewall of course has the ability to log all access to the S-HTTP server and provide a log separate from the WWW server-based logs, and is potentially more secure should the WWW server somehow become compromised.

The prevalent security architecture places externally accessible WWW servers wholly outside the firewall, thus virtually eliminating the capability of auditing access to the WWW server except from users internal to the enterprise. In this case, the network security audit in the form of the network management tool, which monitors the “health” of enterprise components can be called upon to provide a minimal degree of audit over the status of your external WWW server. This type of audit can be important when protecting data which resides on your external server from being subject to “denial of service” attacks, which are not uncommon for external devices. But by utilizing your network management tool to guard against such attacks, and monitoring log alerts on the status or health of this external server, you can reduce the exposure to this type of attack.

Other outside devices that can be utilized to provide audit include the network router between the external WWW server and the true external environment, though these devices are not normally readily set up for comprehensive audit logs, but in some critical cases they could be reconfigured with added hardware and minimal customized programming. One such example would be the “I/P Accounting” function on a popular router product line, which allows off-loading of addresses and protocols through its external interface. This could be beneficial to analyze traffic, and if an attack alert was generated from one of the other logs mentioned, then these router logs could assist in possibly identifying the origin of the attack.

Another possible source of audit logging could come from “back end” systems that the WWW server is programmed to “mine” data from. Many WWW environments are being established to serve as “front ends” for much larger data repositories, such as Oracle data bases, where the WWW server receives user requests for data over HTTP, and the WWW server launches SQL_Net queries to a back end Oracle data base. In this type of architecture the more developed logging inherent to the Oracle environment can be called upon to provide audits over the WWW queries. The detailed Oracle logs can specify the quantity, data type, and other activity over all the queries that the WWW server has made, thus providing a comprehensive activity log that can be consolidated and reviewed should any type of WWW server compromise be suspected. A site could potentially discover the degree of data exposure though these logs.

These are some of the major areas where auditing can be put in place to monitor the WWW environment while enhancing its overall security. It is important to note that the potential placement of audits encompasses the entire distributed computing infrastructure environment, not just the new WWW server itself. In fact, there are some schools of thought that consider the more reliable audits to be those that are somewhat distanced from the target server, thus reducing the potential threat of compromise to the audit logs themselves. In general, the important point is to look at the big picture when designing the security controls and a supporting audit solution.

Previous | Table of Contents | Next